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2
Introduction
“We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth: we will not eradicate violent conflicts in our
lifetimes… There will be times when nations—acting individually or in concert—will find the use of
force not only necessary but morally justified.”
–Barack H. Obama, Nobel Peace Prize Lecture (2009) 1

Centuries ago, Western superpowers that dominated the international playing field
justified their imperialist actions with concepts like the White Man’s Burden and Manifest
Destiny. Today, regional hegemons like the United States growing their empires using more
subtle language. As former president of the United States Barack Obama stated in his Nobel
Peace Prize lecture in 2009, “at the dawn of history, [war’s] morality was not questioned; it was
simply a fact, like drought or disease.” In contrast, today’s leaders and policy-makers discuss
war in clearly defined moral terms. Specifically, many nations including like the United States
use a moral theory about war called “just war theory” to justify employing their armed forces
abroad. In recent years, we see this theory applied in the Middle East especially.
Because it is not likely that we will see war’s end in our lifetime or afterwards, it is
important to continue the discussion on the morality of states’ and world leaders’ actions. As
James M. Dubik accurately states, “War, in several forms, will remain a condition of our
contemporary strategic environment for the foreseeable future.” 2 If we are to at least maintain
some level of peace and to limit the level of suffering around the globe, it is critical that world

1

“The Nobel Peace Prize 2009,” Nobelprize. 10 Dec. 2009,
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html.
22 James M. Dubik, Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 2016), 1.
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powers like the United States do not abuse moral theories about war to meet their own aims and
to make reckless decisions that affect civilians in the Middle East, and elsewhere.
Just war theory justifies war by characterizing a state’s intentions with moral terms. As a
person who is conscious of the disastrous consequences that civil wars and ensuing humanitarian
interventions have on civilian populations, I am critical of policy decisions that may support
intervening in another country’s affairs. One can imagine, then, my unsettlement as I learned
more about the dominance and support for this moral theory. Like others that find themselves
new to the just war tradition, I asked: how can the interference in a sovereign nations’ affairs and
the killing of innocent civilians ever be morally abetted? After further research into the complex
moral theory, one discovers that it justifies war only under certain circumstances. Ultimately, I
came to realize the relevance and pragmatism of the theory’s six major principles.
While the moral theory is not a perfect one it continues to be utilized as the United
States’ preferred moral framework. In this paper, I examine the United States’ current and past
foreign policy actions and presence in the Middle East. I argue that the United States should
continue upholding the principles of just war theory as it is the better theory, in nature, relative to
pacifism and realism, but its leaders should focus more on the theory’s Last Resort Principle to
further limit instances of warfare. Time and again American leaders and policymakers
inappropriately use just war principles as a cover to meet their own political or economic
objectives, most notably, regime change, at the expense of civilian livelihood abroad. The United
States’ application of this theory to justify its actions in the Middle East has proven disastrous
when we examine the number of civilian casualties and quantity of resources spent, ultimately
resulting in ineffective and adverse outcomes, both in the short-term and in the long-term.
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First, I examine how just war theory is present in U.S. leaders’ and policymakers’
rhetoric and actions, citing specific examples from past and current administrations. I look at
Afghanistan as a specific example to highlight the United States’ misuse of just war doctrine
which lead to destructive consequences and a current stalemate in the country. I then look at
America’s current involvement in Syria and how just war language is already being used by
politicians to justify a potential intervention in the state. Last, I assess the United States’
involvement in Yemen to argue that U.S. does not intervene in the Middle East for strictly
humanitarian purposes, but instead to pursue their own interests.
I hope to provide a close assessment of United States’ current presence in the Middle
East by examining its involvement in the past few decades. Like many others studying the
theory’s history and its contemporary application, I am critical of just war theory. However,
upon analyzing alternative theories about war, if utilized appropriately, it is the most reasonable
theory that should lead to less civilian casualties. Still, it is important to question the behaviors of
world superpowers like the United States as their foreign policy actions deeply affect politics
around the world in the long-run.
Method
In this paper, I examine the U.S. government’s use of just war theory to justify its past
and current involvement in the Middle East. I utilize works that are critical to the just war
doctrine, specifically, Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars. I frequently reference Walzer’s
work as it serves as the best tool in understanding contemporary just war theory. I also look at
other significant contemporary works on the theory, like Brian Orend’s The Morality of War,
which provides a clear history and commentary on the theory while analyzing Walzer’s work.
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Because the argument I make focuses on America’s current involvement in the Middle
East, many of the events and wars I cite are ongoing. There are new reports being published each
day. This paper references very recent news articles from media outlets like the New York
Times, CNN, and the Huffington Post, to name a few. Some published as recent as September
2017 are utilized as I attempted to bring in as updated news on the subjects as possible.
I focus on Afghanistan specifically because it marks the start of the United States’ “War
on Terror” and the beginning of a growing fear of extremist terrorists abroad. This is significant
because the War on Terror is prevalent today still and remains a big fear in the minds of those in
the West. The initial reasons for entering the war in Afghanistan seemed necessary and just, but
now, entering its sixteenth year it is becoming increasingly clear that the war fought on Afghan
soil is an unjust one according to just war theory’s six principles as outlined by Walzer. The
waste in American resources and the death of civilian and combatant lives highlights the dangers
in utilizing just war language by world leaders and politicians.
I then turn to events in Syria today. Just war language was used by Obama and its lasting
effects is already being felt under President Trump. As a counter point to the argument that the
United States fights just wars of humanitarian intervention, I introduce Yemen to show that the
U.S. is not wholly committed to fighting just wars or upholding R2P; rather, it is concerned with
more selfish motives that focus on advancing the nation’s own interests and aims.
I choose to look at these three countries—Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen—as separate
cases that represent the consequences of American foreign policy on the Middle East. While
these three countries certainly do not encompass the scope of American involvement in the
Middle East, just war language is used extensively to justify U.S. presence. This along with the
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fact that America is still very involved with the affairs of these countries today is why I have
chosen to focus on them in this paper.
What is Just War Theory?
Just war theory is the doctrine that states that war is only sometimes morally justified. It
is often discussed in comparison to competing approaches to the understanding of the ethics of
war: pacifism and realism. Pacifism states that it is never morally correct to go to war, while
realism argues that morality is irrelevant when judging a state’s motives for going to war and the
conduct of its soldiers in warfare.
Just war theory is a dualistic theory composed of two crucial parts: jus ad bellum and jus
in bello. Walzer distinguishes the former part as “adjectival”—a war can be just or unjust—and
the latter as “adverbial”—a war can be fought justly or unjustly.3 This paper will discuss both
parts, but will focus primarily on jus ad bello: a state’s reasons for going to war rather than the
tactics its military and soldiers use during the war. Jus ad bello requires six commitments or
conditions before engaging in warfare. Brian Orend neatly summarizes Walzer’s six major rules
of just war, which are important to understand for the purposes of this paper, in The Morality of
War:
1. Just cause: International law as endorsed by the United Nation’s Security Council
states that “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”4
2. Right intention: A state must have the right subjective intention for war to be moral. 5

3

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Book, 1977), 21.
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, Article 51, Chapter VII.
http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/.
5 Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006), 46.
4
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3. Public declaration of war by a proper authority: War must be declared publicly to
inform the target that they “now face war and its substantial hazards.” 6
4. Last Resort: States must try diplomacy before turning to war, as outlined in the UN
Charter.
5. Probability of Success: to “bar lethal violence which is known in advance to be
futile.”7
6. Proportionality: “…a state considering a just war must weigh the expected universal
benefits of doing so against the expected universal costs.”8
This paper focuses heavily on the Last Resort principle as it relates to the idea of
diplomatic criticism. Through the different cases presented—Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen—it
becomes clear that American leaders do not acknowledge this principle as they should when
considering the use of their armed force. While each principle is critical in determining whether a
war can be morally justified, I argue that a strong emphasis on state diplomacy using diplomatic
criticism should be implemented before a state decides to intervene in the affairs of another.
History of Just War Theory
Nearly every discussion, critique, or article explaining just war theory’s history begins its
timeline with the writings of Christian theologians like Saint Augustine and ends with those of
contemporary thinkers like Michael Walzer. It is important to provide a brief background of the
doctrine’s history to better understand its main tenets. An examination of its history will also
reveal to us a historical pattern involving dominant powers’ exploitation of the moral theory to
push their own agendas, a pattern that is still prevalent today.

6

Ibid., 50.
Ibid., 58.
8 Ibid., 59.
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Brian Orend provides a concise yet detailed “sweeping history of just war theory” in the
first chapter of The Morality of War.9 While many scholars and historians cite Saint Augustine
and other Christian thinkers as the founders of the theory, he states the beginning of the theory to
be in the 4th century B.C. with the coining of “just war” by Aristotle. 10 Later in history, just war
doctrine is associated with Christianity as Christian thinkers attempted to justify the prevalence
of holy wars. Saint Augustine focused heavily on “right intention” and in doing so, “[blurred] the
line between just wars and holy wars”.11
An important contribution to the evolution of just war theory is the idea that only a proper
authority may declare war. This idea was supported by ancient Greek philosopher and politician
Cicero, who believed the state to be an authority of “goodness” and that just wars can only be
waged by states.12 A declaration of war by any other actor would not be considered “proper”.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) also focused on the proper authority in declaring war—
only political authorities could declare war but should consult with the Church; later, Francisco
de Vitoria of Spain (1492-1546) argued that non-Christian communities may also declare war. 13
Even more than Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius (1538-1645) argued for the secularization of
the theory and rejected holy wars altogether; thus, Grotius paved the way for modern just war
theory.14
Grotius’ contribution led to the eventual codification of just war theory into law in the
19th century. Jus in bello rules were codified in the “Lieber’s Code” following the American

9

Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 10.
11 Ibid., 12.
12 Temes, Peter, The Just War: An American Reflection on the Morality of War in Our Time
(Ivan R. Dee, 2004), 57.
13 Orend, 16.
14 Ibid., 17.
10
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Civil War and later in the 1999 Hague Conventions. In the 20th century, just war theory became
popular again immediately following World War II, evident in the 1954 UN Charter which
focused on just war theory’s jus ad bellum aspect. Even more literature on the theory was
produced in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, with many people condemning the unjust
behavior of U.S. soldiers.15
We now have a basic understanding of the theory’s history. Beginning with Aristotle, just
war theory took centuries to craft, used for a time to further Christian religious tradition and later
to reject the Christian holy wars. Just war theory proved never to be a neutral theory as it was
used in the past to further a powerful state’s own agenda, like the justification of Christian holy
wars. While modern just war theory is primarily secular in nature as it is used to defend human
rights rather than religion, it is still utilized to advance influential countries’ own interests—like
the United States’ pro-war agenda to implement policies of regime change in foreign countries—
and that becomes the focus of this paper.
Literature Review
Although several significant articles on the doctrine flourished in the 1970s, Walzer’s
work remains the single most influential piece. In Brian Orend’s words, Walzer’s “breakthrough
work… has been to current just theory what Grotius’ The Law of War and Peace was to prior
centuries.”16 In this paper, I will use Michael Walzer’s discussion of the theory and his own
definition of specific terms in Just and Unjust Wars as the accepted contemporary definition of
just war theory. For this reason, his books, claims, and definitions are referenced throughout the
paper.

15
16

Ibid., 20-24.
Ibid., 24.
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In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer provides historical examples to illustrate what a just war
and an unjust war look like, utilizing World War II and the Vietnam War as primary examples to
guide his argument—he paints America’s entrance into World War II as justified while the
actions of American soldiers in Vietnam were unjust.17 Rather than setting his argument against
a religious backdrop to support the doctrine as past just war theorists and philosophers have
done, Walzer focuses on humanitarian rights, making his work influential in the aftermath of the
Vietnam War.18
It is important to explore alternative theories to just war theory as well as dominant
criticisms of the theory. Therefore, this section examines pacifist and realist theory and I discuss
the combination of diplomatic theory and just war theory together to bring about the best results.
Pacifist and realist theory can be thought of on the opposite ends of the same spectrum in judging
the morality of war.
Pacifism
Just war theory is often compared to other approaches to judging the ethics of war, one of
which is pacifism. The just war doctrine states that war is only sometimes permissible under
certain circumstances while pacifism states that war is never morally permissible.
While pacifism on the surface would be the ideal method in thinking about war (no war
means no casualties, no civilian deaths; thus, less suffering) its efficacy is highly unlikely
considering the circumstances that exist in our world. Although one or a few international actors
may attempt to follow pacifist theory, it is unlikely that all other actors in the international
community will follow suit. We cannot assume this from every world power especially when

17
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Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 100.
Ibid.
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irrational leaders exist. In fact, by stating that war is never permissible, pacifists are irrational;
they do not consider the actions of state actors in rational terms. Because of this, many critics of
pacifism believe certain types of pacifists allow war to continue. Contemporary critics of antiwar activists like Lauryn Oates claim pacifists are “abetters of war” because they allow
“psychopath” regimes like that of Bashar al-Assad’s in Syria to continue committing acts of
violence against its own civilians.19 In a way, pacifists allow crime-committing regimes to
perpetuate the violence in their refusal to respond to them.
In 2016, a Vatican conference called on Pope Francis to reject the Catholic church’s
traditional teachings on just war theory. Although the Archbishop John Baptist Odama of
Uganda is correct in stating that “any war is destruction,” he and other members of the Vatican
conference are misguided in calling for a “new framework that is consistent with the Gospel of
nonviolence” because it ignores the real threats of today. 20 While Jesus’s nonviolent teachings
are attractive and its utopian ends are preferred to what occurs daily across the globe, it is
unrealistic to expect states to adhere to them today. The massive and real threats of terrorism and
the actions of non-rational state leaders make it impossible to remain “non-violent” when a state
has the means of responding to these violent threats. In addition, many of these threats are
perpetuated by nonbelievers; thus, Christian teachings and the faith in God is irrelevant. Nonviolence will not be able to end or even limit the suffering caused by war.

19

Lauryn Oates, “Let’s Get Clear on What Pacifism Really Means,” Huffington Post. 5 March
2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/lauryn-oates/pacifism-meaning-peace_b_16416640.html.
20 Joshua McElwee, “Landmark Vatican conference rejects just war theory, asks for encyclical
on nonviolence,” National Catholic Reporter, 14 April 2016.
https://www.ncronline.org/news/vatican/landmark-vatican-conference-rejects-just-war-theoryasks-encyclical-nonviolence.
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Pacifism’s impracticality and inherent irrationality make it the least helpful in thinking
about the ethics of war. In the face of contemporary violence that takes the form of humanitarian
crises, terrorism, and actions of non-rational state actors, idleness will only lead to more
suffering. Although just war theory is not flawless, its goal is to limit the destructiveness of war
while pacifism refuses to even take part in the process of limiting this suffering. States have the
means through self-defense and interventions, if carried out properly, to save civilian lives,
whether it be their own or a foreign country’s.
Realism
Realism is another approach often referenced when talking about war and it would fall on
the opposite end of the spectrum relative to pacifism. Realism states that morality does not have
a place when talking about war or the behavior of states. For realists, the Latin saying “inter
arma silent leges” describes war: in time of war, the law is silent. 21
Realism contends that morality has no place in war. When talking about war, there is a
denial of the “meaningfulness of moral argument.”22 Talking about morality reaches no goals or
ends; thus, it must be irrelevant during wartime and any argument for or against it would be
simply a waste of time and effort. This approach to thinking about war is dangerous because it
allows militaries and individual soldiers to commit atrocities without impunity. For many just
war thinkers like Walzer, this aspect to realism is a big red flag.
Realism’s assumptions regarding how the international political system is arranged is
relevant in the field of just war theory; however, what follows from these assumptions are not
accurate in contemporary war. In an anarchic system where there is no one authoritative state,

21
22

Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3.
Ibid., 10.
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each state behaves rationally, meaning it makes decisions which are most advantageous for its
own country. States will do anything to protect and advance their own national interests even if it
means engaging in disastrous wars; morality is missing from the discussion.
However, the world as it today is much more complex than realism illustrates and moral
commitments are in fact relevant in wartime. The concept of humanitarian rights is now clearly
codified, defined, and backed by international law. Because of this, it is necessary to think about
morality during war and when we try to justify interventions, even if states prefer not to do so.
In contemporary times, it is extremely rare for a state to disregard morality completely.
While national interests may be the priority for states, moral commitments are still
acknowledged. In criticizing realist theory, Orend assesses the similarities between morality and
strategy to argue that states act upon the basis of both national interests and moral commitments.
He argues that “both discourses are devoted to evaluating the same course of action—the
deployment of armed force in foreign affairs—and to enabling guiding rules.”23 Both discourses
appeal to the public for support of their actions and states are free to act in alternative ways.
Because of the worldwide pressure on states to make the morally correct choices that align with
international and humanitarian law, moral commitments not only exist but are important in the
minds of state leaders and militaries when they make decisions. The developed and modern
perspective of human rights that is dominant today make morality central in any states’ political
plans. Thus, realism cannot be the best theory is discussions on war.
Diplomatic Criticism
Diplomatic criticism is another approach to thinking about war. This approach
emphasizes the fourth requirement of just war theory: the last resort. While I argue that just war

23

Orend, Morality of War, 227.
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theory is the best way to minimize war’s catastrophic consequences, a stricter focus and
utilization of diplomatic criticism will help further limit these consequences. James Pattison
outlines the concept of diplomatic criticism, providing a starting point in the discussion on the
normative considerations that it raises. Pattison’s definition of the approach should be
implemented in current and future discussions on just war theory and the Last Resort principle.
Pattison’s interpretation of the Last Resort principle heavily emphasizes finding other
alternatives before resorting to war. He introduces his own account called the ‘Presumptive Last
Resort’: “war should (generally) be the last feasible option; and the comparatively best nonviolent, feasible option(s) should be tried first.” 24 Following this definition, there is a
presumption rather than a prohibition against resorting to war first, and there is a favor in finding
other solutions instead. In Pattison’s interpretation, Presumptive Last Resort is not narrowly
instrumentalist, and it emphasizes that doing harm as opposed to allowing harm should be
avoided.
Although many see the approach as a tactic to avoid making significant decisions,
Pattison argues that diplomatic criticism is preferable to other means of addressing mass
atrocities and external aggression, like war and economic sanctions.25 Still, Pattison is pragmatic
in his view because he understands the inevitability of war. Even if states are in the middle of
war, he argues, diplomatic criticism should be utilized because it provides a clear and public
justification for the war. Without diplomatic criticism’s ability to direct international attention at

24

Ibid., 951.
James Pattison, “The ethics of diplomatic criticism: The Responsibility to Protect, Just War
Theory and Presumptive Last Resort.” The European Journal for International Relations, vol.2,
no. 4 (2015), 936.
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states’ behaviors, more crimes may go unnoticed and more countries may involve themselves in
unjust wars.
Additionally, Pattison argues that when states are criticized— “named and shamed”—
challenges are posed to their international standing and the result is a loss in legitimacy. This loss
in legitimacy will push states to alter their behavior and lead to policy changes.26 In this way, a
shift in focus towards the Last Resort principle through diplomatic criticism rather than other just
war principles—like just cause or probability of success, which are difficult to measure in
hypothetical scenarios—will see change in the behavior of dangerous states before engaging in
war. Pattison’s definition of diplomatic criticism will truly limit the use of armed forces, helping
just war theory’s cause. His amendment of the Last Resort principle should be considered by
political scientists and just war theorists and will be an important starting point in the discourse
on diplomacy in the future.
Just war theory is the most appealing theory when thinking about war. As much as we
would like for pacifist theory to be the dominant mode in thinking about the morality of war, it is
inherently irrational. While Orend argues that every moral theory is simply a way in trying to
keep our hands “clean” in the face of war’s atrocities, pacifist theory seems to fall most in line
with this imagery. Conscious of terrorism, sectarianism, civil war, and genocide occurring either
on the other side of the world from them or within their own countries, they opt out of making
any tangible difference or change. Unlike diplomatic criticism which does call for states to act in
a way that is different from war and sanctions, pacifists remain truly inactive, and their inaction
allows for more atrocities and tragedies to occur.
Supreme Emergencies

26
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Although I argue that just war theory is preferable to alternative theories about war like
pacifism and realism, the theory is still flawed for its utilitarian aspects, mainly, the case for
supreme emergencies. The existence of this case allows influential leaders to make unjust,
unlawful, and dystopian military decisions without impunity.
As arguably the most influential contemporary work on just war theory, Walzer’s Just
and Unjust Wars has elicited much criticism since its publication, which he addresses years later
in Arguing About War.27 Much of the criticism focuses on the concept of supreme emergencies
which appears in his “Dilemmas of War” chapter in Just and Unjust War. In a supreme
emergency case, a country is justified in targeting and attacking enemy civilians. Walzer defines
supreme emergencies by two criteria: the imminence of the danger as well as its nature, and
“neither one by itself is sufficient”; thus, both must be applied for an event to be considered a
supreme emergency. 28 The concept of supreme emergencies is the biggest point of contention in
Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars among scholars. For Michael Neu, supreme emergencies are
unlike “any other situation in the moral world, for they make it impossible for a moral agent not
to commit a severe moral crime”; thus, for him, any “justified military act in war which
foreseeably causes innocent people to die is a supreme emergency act”. 29 Brian Orend calls it the
“most controversial, and consequential, amendment to just war theory ever proposed.” 30 He
points out the paradoxical nature of Walzer’s supreme emergency, and places Walzer as the one

27

Michael Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 252.
29 Neu, Michael. “The supreme emergency of war: a critique of Walzer.” SAGE Journals. 1 Feb.
2014, 4.
30 Orend, The Morality of War, 141.
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who is “fundamentally responsible for” the exemption of supreme emergencies to exist within
just war theory. 31
Walzer uses World War II to illustrate the case, emphasizing the evil of Nazi Germany as
Great Britain’s justification in bombing civilian areas in Germany. In Walzer’s example, the
Nazis were the supreme emergency because they became “an ultimate threat to everything
decent in our lives, an ideology and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to
those who might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond
calculation, immeasurably awful.” 32 Thus, the threat of the Nazis winning the war was enough
justification for the British to target civilians in Germany.
Walzer’s attempt in justifying the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki has also led
many to criticize his definition of supreme emergency. He states that during WWII, the “war
aims of the American government required either an invasion of the main islands, with enormous
losses of American and Japanese soldiers and of Japanese civilians trapped in war zones, or the
use of the atomic bomb.”33 In this case, the United States had no choice but to eradicate millions
of people with the atomic bomb. Walzer’s attempts in weighing the different actions in a
utilitarian method becomes ethically and morally problematic. In both examples, the targeting of
German and Japanese civilians was so horrendous that it inspired the fourth Geneva convention
of 1949, which outlawed deliberate attack on civilians. To the international community,
America’s and the U.K.’s actions during the second World War were morally unjustifiable.
While defending the exemption of supreme emergencies, Walzer states: “Perhaps it is
only a matter of arithmetic: individuals cannot kill other individuals to save themselves, but to
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Orend, Morality of War, 140.
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 253.
33 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 266.
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save a nation we can violate the rights of a determinate but smaller number of people.” 34 The
idea that states are permitted to attack enemy civilian populations if the number is “smaller” is
utilitarian because it weighs the consequences of actions rather than the actions themselves. Even
just one civilian death, intentional or not, should be unacceptable. Considering Walzer’s
quotation above, supreme emergency cases allow “collateral damage” and the incidental killing
of civilians to be swept under the rug. Focusing less on the utilitarian aspect of just war theory
will make civilian lives matter more to states. By spending more time, for instance, on
emphasizing the last resort principle and less time on the proportionality principle, we can avoid
civilian deaths. It is this consequentialist and utilitarian aspect of just war theory that renders the
death of one civilian insignificant. While the other just war principles are also crucial to the
theory, more time spent on the Last Resort will emphasize the magnitude of each civilian death
and will hopefully decrease instances of collateral damage.
The exception of the supreme emergency case is dangerous because it enables powerful
states to make utilitarian decisions that would not be considered ethically moral if examined
from outside of the utilitarian philosophy. This is evident in the 2011 killing of Abdulrahman
aw-Alwaki in Yemen under the order of former President Barack Obama as a part of a targeted
killing operation.
The aftermath of 9/11 saw a massive push for counterterrorism policies during the Bush
administration, leading many to view the country as being in a state of supreme emergency,
placing the terrorists as the priority threat to the country’s security. This counterterrorism focus
resulted in the creation of a kill-list ten years later. A front-page story in the New York Times
published in 2012 covered the story extensively, highlighting the questionable nature of Obama’s
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counterterrorism strategies and his overall moral principles. 35 Obama oversaw approving every
name on the kill list, giving him the “final moral calculation.” 36 A target on that list was Anwar
al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American born in America and suspected of later joining al-Qaeda in
Yemen, and his son Abdulrahman aw-Alwaki.
Obama called the decision to kill Anwar an “easy one.”37 Under the supreme emergency
case, the killing of Aw-Alwaki’s father is justified because it involved the killing of our
enemies’—al-Qaeda’s—civilians. However, Obama stretched the exemption to include not only
minor not given a trial, but also an American citizen. A utilitarian would argue that Obama’s
actions are justified because it removed the possibility of a dangerous terrorist as a threat to
America’s security. It is possible that Abdulrahman could have ended up like his father, an
influential and “dangerous” cleric with suspected al-Qaeda affiliations. A just war theorist would
agree with the utilitarian, saying that the supreme emergency case justifies this because al-Qaeda
has been a major threat to America’s security since before the war in Afghanistan.
If we are to look at the situation in terms of legality rather than “arithmetic” and
utilitarianism, Obama’s actions would be deemed unconstitutional and many have acknowledged
them as grounds for impeachment. Thus, we can see how accepting Walzer’s definition of a
supreme emergency and his example of Great Britain’s actions during World War II sets a
dangerous precedent for today’s world leaders.
This case highlights the utilitarian aspect of just war theory and exemplifies how
disastrously the supreme emergency exemption can be interpreted. The utilitarian aspect of just

Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,”
The New York Times. 29 May 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamasleadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
35

20
war theory must be acknowledged and studied by political leaders, policymakers, and military
leaders. In this case, it allowed a president to place an American minor on a kill list and murder
him without due process in a country that America is not at war with. Obama’s inappropriate use
of the supreme emergency case coupled with a lack of international criticism of the event led to
unjustifiable actions.
Although the targeted killing was a covert mission, diplomatic criticism of this event
should have been emphasized once information and evidence was made available. Widespread
diplomatic criticism should have been evoked and the U.S. government should have been held
accountable for its actions and punished accordingly. Additionally, the killing of minor
Abdulrahman aw-Awlaki without trial could have potentially been avoided if there was an
international shift to diplomatic criticism at the start of America’s counterterrorism policies
during the Bush administration. If events like the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were more
heavily criticized from the start, rather than having been supported by major allies like Britain,
Germany, and Canada, perhaps our massive war on terror could have been more narrowly
focused, resulting in less bloody wars.
Humanitarian Interventions and R2P
Humanitarian interventions remain a contentious topic because of the moral dilemma it
poses: “Does the duty to respect state sovereignty trump the responsibility of the international
community to take action when the people of a nation are at risk?” 38 When a foreign state
contemplates engaging in a humanitarian intervention, it must decide whether responding to the
crisis that civilians in a state face is more important than respecting that state’s autonomy. Just
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war theorists agree that this dilemma should always be acknowledged and the decision to enter
another state military should never be made in haste.
Another issue arising with humanitarian interventions is the deliberate policy of regime
change enacted by foreign powers. Humanitarian interventions conflict with state sovereignty
because regime change means the replacement of the current government with another through
military force. Walzer notes in the preface of Just and Unjust Wars that “the primary aim of the
[humanitarian] intervention is to stop the killing; regime change follows from that purpose.” 39 As
we will discuss in the cases of Afghanistan and Yemen, it is evident that regime change falls
higher on the United States’ list of priorities than the objective to end civilian suffering.
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P) states that “State sovereignty carried with it
the obligation of the State to protect its own people, and that if the State was unwilling or unable
to do so, the responsibility shifted to the international community to use diplomatic,
humanitarian and other means to protect them” in accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of the
UN Charter. Kofi Annan addresses and challenges the dilemma that arises out of humanitarian
interventions in his 2000 Millennium Report when he asks, “if humanitarian intervention is,
indeed, an unacceptable assault on state sovereignty, how should we respond… to gross and
systematic violation of human rights that offend ever precept of our common humanity?” In
2005, member states of the United Nations endorsed the concept at the 2005 high-level UN
World Summit meeting in response to past atrocities like those in Rwanda, Kosovo, and
Srebrenica.40
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The United States plays an important role when it comes to R2P. In its statement at the
2012 Human Rights Council 20th Session, the U.S. delegation reiterated its commitment to “three
pillars” of the Responsibility to Protect:
The essential responsibility of States to protect their own citizens, [its] shared
responsibility to take appropriate steps to assist States in exercising that solemn duty, and
[its] preparedness to take timely and decisive action where national authorities manifestly
failed to do so.41
Business Insider ranked the U.S. first in its “strongest militaries” list in 2016, which cited its
massive defense budget, number of active frontline personnel, tanks, total aircraft, and
submarines relative to other nations. 42 For many, the United States’ military prowess make it
responsible in engaging in the affairs of other states when the state’s own regime cannot or when
that state is responsible for the human rights abuses.
R2P is important in our discussion on the U.S.’s application of just war theory in the
Middle East when we assess the country’s irregular use of the principle to justify cross-border
interference in other states’ affairs. The U.S. seems only to remember the Responsibility to
Protect principle in certain cases. Although R2P was not implicitly invoked until the Libyan civil
war in 2011, it was applied in the case of Afghanistan and now more leaders are calling on
America’s and the rest of the West’s responsibility to take military action in Syria. R2P is a
crucial principle in addressing the Taliban’s crimes in Afghanistan and Bashar al-Assad’s regime
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in Syria. Despite the United States’ statements regarding its commitment to R2P, little advocacy
for the principle is seen surrounding the current humanitarian crises in Yemen, forcing one to
wonder about the U.S.’s true motives in the Middle East.
Just War Theory and the U.S.
Just war theory is important in both international law as well as within the United States.
In international law, it is present under United Nation charters and in the United States, it is
present in the rhetoric of political leaders and in military spaces.
While there is no one authoritative state to police the actions of other state actors
throughout the international community, the United Nations has become the institution that has
assumed somewhat of an authority role to check state actions. Article 51 of the UN Charter,
which states that an armed attack against any member state of the UN allows for self-defense or
other-defense, indicates that the United Nations also adopts just war theory within its moral
framework.43 Article 51 of the UN Charter makes an act of self-defense or other-defense lawful
and just, fitting into the category of jus ad bellum (the right to go to war). Through the U.S.’s
membership and active participation in the UN, the U.S. automatically adopts this part of just
war theory when it comes to state aggression and self-defense. A famous application of this
article occurred in World War II, when the United States entered the war and joined the Allies
side of the war after Germany committed an act of aggression against Poland.44
Since the events of World War II, the application of just war theory is present in the
foreign policy decisions of the United States. Many cite the Weinberger Doctrine of 1984, which
later influenced the Powell Doctrine, as a prominent example of a framework that justified the
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use of armed force by the U.S.45 The Weinberger Doctrine, like just war theory’s six principles,
aims to limit the use of armed forces. In a 1984 speech to the National Press Club, Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger argues that both “undue reserve” and employing armed forces “as a
regular and customary part of diplomatic efforts” are neither solutions in responding to
international events.46 Instead, he outlines six tests that should be applied when considering the
use of combat forces abroad.
Many of the Weinberger Doctrine’s tests mirror just war theory’s own principles: the test
to employ forces overseas only if it is “deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies”
matches just war’s “right intention” principle; the “clear intention of winning” test with the
probability of success; having “clearly defined political and military objectives” matches the
right intention principle; and, most importantly the sixth and final test which states that “the
commitment of the U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort” takes from just war theory’s
concept of last resort.47 Just war theory influenced Weinberger’s invention of these six major
tests intended to limit the destructiveness of war.
Post 9/11, just war thinking’s jus in bello aspect has greatly influenced professional U.S.
military education and training. Under the Geneva treaty obligations, the Law of Armed Conflict
(LOAC) regulates war by protecting civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded, the sick, and
shipwrecked.48 Thus, LOAC considers justice in war—jus in bello—rather than focusing on the
right in going to war—jus ad bellum. Martin L. Cook notes that this doctrine is incorporated in
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military education and training at every level, from recommissioning military education
programs like ROTC in which students are often required to take philosophy courses, to
traditional combat environments, to military officers ensuring that the actions of their unit are
within the bounds of LOAC. 49
Neta C. Crawford examines the U.S. military’s understanding of the discrimination and
proportionality principles of just war theory. She cites how the U.S. military reflects both the jus
in bello and jus ad bello guidelines of just war theory. US military field manuals and legal
documents refer to the Geneva conventions as a source of military law in America. When
making decisions about the use of force, the U.S. military uses both the framework of
international law as well as analysis regarding potential “collateral damage”, meaning the
incidental killing of civilians during a strike. 50 The U.S. “Standing Rules of Engagement”
(SROE) also reflect just war notions. These rules of engagement outline general rules for the use
of force. SROE discusses military necessity as the license for permission of use of force as selfdefense, and the jus ad bellum criteria of proportionality is important and required for selfdefense in the January 2000 SROE. Here, proportionality can act as a limit on the use of force,
even as the use of force is used to override certain limits. 51
We can now see how just war theory has influenced both the decisions of U.S.
policymakers and leaders as well as professional military training that dictates the actions of
individual soldiers on the ground. U.S. leaders stress jus ad bellum requirements when justifying
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their reasons for entering a war while the military uses jus in bello requirements laid out by the
United Nations.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan will serve as a past example showcasing the heavy use of just war language
by American leaders and politicians to justify intervention and continued action in the Middle
East. The Bush administration did much to frame its decisions using just war terms and rhetoric,
and we see a similar method utilized under both the Obama and Trump administrations. This
section discusses the short and long-term effects of just war language used during the Bush
administration.
The start of the ongoing war in Afghanistan officially began when the United States
invaded in 2001 after the Taliban refused to give up Osama bin Laden. After the 9/11 attacks, the
target and enemy became clear to the West: al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime that supported it.
American leaders and Congressmen capitalized on the use of just war rhetoric to drum up
support for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency agendas to invade the country and topple the
Taliban regime, allowing the U.S. to install a democratic government more favorable to its own
interests, which is a strategy it later implemented in other regions of the Middle East.
In her article titled “Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War,” Neta C. Crawford
assesses how the Bush administration framed its rhetoric in jus ad bellum terms regarding
Afghanistan.52 She argues that the administration stressed the right to self-defense and the Last
Resort—two critical just war principles. She cites Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as
defending America’s foreign policy by claiming its actions to be in self-defense: “….the only
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way to deal with the terrorist network is to take the battle to them. That is in fact what we’re
doing. That is in effect self-defense of a preemptive nature.”53 The events of 9/11 showed the
world that war has changed and showed America that it must prepare for this change, most
notably by pursuing its war on terror. Crawford asks whether America’s response to this change
through an agenda promoting counterterrorism is just.54 Like many political scientists, Crawford
is critical of the U.S. government’s reliance on just war rhetoric to start wars in Afghanistan as
well as in Iraq, but she ultimately favors the theory over others as it remains a “useful method of
inquiry into the problems of contemporary war.” 55
The counterterrorism objective enabled the Bush administration to invade Afghanistan
and pursue a policy of regime change that continues to guide American foreign policy in the
Middle East. During the Bush administration, the counterterrorism objective was also coupled
with intentions of humanitarian action as justification for invading the country. This became a
central component of Laura Bush’s agenda, first-lady at the time, to promote women’s rights in
Afghanistan at a time where women lacked basic rights under the Taliban’s rule.56
Many view the war in Afghanistan as a failure. The military’s hastiness in entering the
war, the duration of the conflict—it is the longest war fought in America’s history— the amount
of resources wasted and the number of combatant and non-combatant lives lost, and the Afghan
government’s current instability alongside growing Taliban presence prove that the last resort,
proportionality, and probability of success criteria of just war theory have not been met, making
the invasion of Afghanistan sixteen years ago unjust. According to veteran and special advisor to
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commanding generals in Iraq and Afghanistan James M. Dubik, this hastiness resulted in
“insufficient intellectual, strategic, organizational, and logistic preparation.” In 2006, Bush
realized the negative impact of his just war language as he acknowledges his policy’s failure in
Afghanistan when he writes that “the multilateral approach to rebuilding… was failing” and that
NATO’s contribution resulted in “little coordination between countries, and no one devoted
enough resources to the effort”; he admits that America was “not prepared for nation building.”57
Still today we see that Obama and Trump attempt to justify America’s entrance into the region
and the presence of its troops in the country today.
Obama promised the American people he would deescalate the number of troops on the
ground in Afghanistan, and this promise proved difficult to keep during his time in office. When
speaking to the annual Veterans of Foreign Wars conference in 2009, Obama’s speech reflected
just war language: “This is not a war of choice. This is a war of necessity. Those who attacked
America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again. If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean
an even larger safe haven from which al-Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans.”58 Again, we
see the president of the U.S. attempt to justify the unjust war in Afghanistan by pitting the
Taliban as the external enemy and playing on the fear that 9/11 instilled in the American people
sixteen years ago. While the threat may be real, the president emphasizes the necessity of his
actions and of having troops stay in Afghanistan. He highlights the dangerous possibility—that
the terrorists are “plotting to do so again”—as an attempt to gain support for his decisions in
Afghanistan. In speeches like this, the former president attempts to appeal to the American
public’s interests, or fears, as a means of gaining support for his foreign policy decisions.
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Although viewed as an overall embarrassing war for the world power, the U.S. continues
its presence in the country. While Trump was vocal about his opposition to America’s
involvement in Afghanistan during his presidential campaign, in August of 2017 he revealed
America’s plan to increase the number of troops there by several thousand in addition to the
approximately 8,400 troops already stationed. 59 So, if the war is unjust and proves to be
unsuccessful, why is the U.S. military still there?
While America’s justification in the past involved humanitarian reasons, today its troops
remain in Afghanistan because they are, essentially, stuck. Plans to transform Afghanistan into a
democracy that better suits America’s liking has installed a new government that the country
must watch over and it must fulfill its commitment to the counterterrorism objective it made to
both its own citizens and the citizens of Afghanistan long ago. If the United States left now while
the Afghan government and forces are still weak, there is a fear that terrorist groups will return to
power. Although the United States may have had the right intention by just war theory’s
standards (the right intention principle states that a state must have the right subjective intention
for war to be moral) in entering Afghanistan in 2001—to remove the Taliban from power and
weaken al-Qaeda bases—the war it fought and continues to fight today cannot be called just.
Leaders were wrong in 2001 for emphasizing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism attacks as
it hastened the start of the war, allowing U.S. leaders and policymakers to neglect the last resort
principle of just war theory. It is also what keeps U.S. forces trapped in the country today, as it
attempts to keep the promise of counterterrorism it made long ago.
Syria
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An ongoing and destructive civil war beginning in 2011 has taken its toll on the civilian
population of Syria; a complex situation involving multiple layers of actors has led to a
devastating humanitarian crisis and one of history’s worst refugee crises. As a result, many
leaders are calling for a humanitarian intervention in the country. We can see already in Trump’s
presidency a dominance of just war language taking form to support stronger U.S. presence in
the Middle East, thus continuing the foreign policies favoring intervention under both Obama
and Bush. Considering Walzer’s description of humanitarian interventions—“the primary aim of
the intervention is to stop the killing; regime change follows from that purpose”—the American
desire to oust Assad from power appears to be stronger than the desire to end the suffering of the
Syrian people.60
During former president Barack Obama’s term in office, just war language was often
used to describe the U.S.’s military objectives and plans. In his 2014 commencement address at
West Point, well into the Syrian civil war, Obama discusses U.S. foreign policy:
“The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary… when our people
are threatened; when our livelihoods are at stake; when the security of our allies is in
danger… In these circumstances, we still need to ask tough questions about whether our
actions are proportional and effective and just.” 61
Here, Obama reflects the jus ad bello guidelines of proportionality, probability of success
(which he calls “[effectiveness]”), and just cause when considering military action.
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In describing the standard view of humanitarian interventions, one that places the source
of inhumanity as an external figure such as a tyrant, Walzer rightly asks, “But what if the trouble
is internal… not quite a ‘war of all against all’ but a widely dispersed, disorganized and
murderous war of some against some… We are extraordinarily dependent on the
victim/victimizer, good guys/bad guys model.” 62 This question arises in Syria’s case today, as
current President Bashar al-Assad still has considerable support at home, making the standard
model of humanitarian intervention difficult to define and much more controversial if imposed
there.63
Although criticized for not doing enough during the early years of the Syrian civil war,
Obama did much to escalate the conflict. In 2014, he ordered airstrikes against ISIS strongholds
in the country, using warplanes and Tomahawk cruise missiles. 64 The presence of the U.S.
military in Syria’s airspace is a violation of Syria’s sovereignty, reflecting one side of the
humanitarian intervention dilemma, as mentioned earlier. However, an even more detrimental
strategy involved Obama’s covert program designed to fund and arm anti-Assad rebel groups in
the country—a program that cost the U.S. over $1 billion. This program was deemed
unsuccessful by many and even called a “failure” by Obama himself. 65 Part of its ineffectiveness
lies in the fact that some weapons landed in the hands of al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra Front
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fighters, as some rebels were associated with the group. 66 These rebels only further contributed
to civilian suffering in Syria as some were reported to have been involved with a military
offensive that killed about 190 civilians and captured over 200 hostages in 2013. 67 Can we then
appropriately say that the U.S.’s primary aim in Syria is to “stop the killing” rather than
aggressively pursue a policy of regime change? Obama’s decisions to fund rebel groups reveal
his primary objective in attacking the Syrian government forces rather than saving and protecting
innocent civilian lives.
Furthermore, with Pattison’s amendment of the last resort principle in mind, it becomes
increasingly clear that the Trump Administration is not prioritizing the last resort principle and is
pushing for more U.S. military presence in Syria with a goal of regime change in mind. Although
Trump ended Obama’s covert program, he continues an intense air campaign against ISIS as
well as a “train-and-equip” program focusing on Kurdish rebels. While the Syrian regime has
committed legitimate crimes against its civilians in the past, attacks from earlier this year have
been disproportionately emphasized. Just two days after the reported sarin attacks on Khan
Sheikhoun on April 4, 2017, Trump launched 59 Tomahawk missiles at a Syrian air base.
Trump’s missile launch was done before the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons released its report on the attack (which did not put concrete blame on the Assad regime
at the time)68 and before the U.N. commission released its report on September 6, which became
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the first authoritative statement that pinned responsibility on the Syrian government. 69 Although
this may have proved to the rest of the world the might of President Trump and the American
military, it killed nine civilians in the process.70 Trump’s hastiness in firing missiles into Syria
demonstrate his eagerness to begin an intervention in Syria, his disregard for just war theory’s
Last Resort principle, and, like Obama before him, the American priority of regime change over
respecting civilian lives.
This is where the line between fulfilling the R2P principle and promoting regime change
to satisfy America’s own political interests abroad becomes blurred. There is no denying that
there is a humanitarian crisis and complex emergency in Syria. Bashar al-Assad is considered a
war criminal for his human rights abuses by criminal investigators and by leaders all over the
world.71 However, immediately framing newly uncovered or newly reported events to evoke
sympathy and anger from those in the West in an effort to support regime change ideas,
ultimately pushing a pro-war agenda in the region, will not end the suffering of the Syrian people
either in the short or long-run. By pursuing this regime change policy, the U.S. will likely see
results that mirror those of Afghanistan and also Iraq: a defeated and unstable country creating a
vacuum for extremist forces to move into and gain power over the vulnerable communities still
there.
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American leaders must learn from the adverse consequences that arose after the invasion
of Afghanistan. American leaders and policymakers must be hesitant in assuming just war
language to frame the Syrian civil war, and must be careful in deciding their military strategies in
the region if they do not want to be trapped in a stalemate in the country in sixteen years as they
find themselves in Afghanistan today.
Yemen
Yemen also faces a disastrous humanitarian crisis stemming from a civil war, one that,
for a long time, has been overlooked by Western media. Like Syria, there are multiple layers
involving multiple actors contributing to Yemen’s conflict, all of whom do much to exacerbate
humanitarian issues ravaging the country. However, in Yemen’s case, we do not see a major
media coverage or calls for a humanitarian intervention by politicians as we do in Syria. This can
be attributed to the war’s conflicting United States’ interests in the country.
The civil war in Yemen began in March 2015 when President Abradabbuh Mansur Hadi
fled the Yemeni capital of Sanaa after Houthi rebels gained more control in the country since
they took over the capital 2014. This prompted Saudi Arabia to involve itself in Yemen’s affairs
by leading an airstrike coalition of ten countries, including members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) targeting Houthi bases in Sanaa. Additionally, in March 2015, ISIS began
carrying out its first significant attacks in Yemen which greatly escalated the conflict. Thus,
Yemeni civilians are trapped in the middle of an armed conflict occurring both on the ground and
in the air. As a result, an estimated 17.8 million are food insecure and 16 million lack access to
safe water and sanitation, with approximately 1.8 million children acutely malnourished. This,
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plus a massive and unprecedented cholera outbreak, has ruined the livelihoods of Yemeni
civilians of all ages, putting the country in despair. 72
In Yemen’s case, it is reported that all parties to the conflict have committed grave
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including the U.S.-backed Saudi
airstrike coalition. 73 Amnesty International reports that 34 airstrikes across six different
governorates led by Saudi Arabia have violated the laws of war (jus in bello). These attacks
deliberately targeted civilians and institutions like hospitals, mosques, and schools, which can be
a war crime.74 Thus, Saudi Arabia and its allies are committing human rights crimes against
civilians in Yemen with Yemeni people suffering tremendously as a result. So why are there no
calls for humanitarian intervention and for the upholding of the Responsibility to Protect in this
case? Why is just war language not being used to promote American intervention to save the
Yemeni people?
If the United States were truly committed to upholding the Responsibility to Protect and
humanitarian action as it claims it were doing so in Afghanistan and now in Syria, and if it
genuinely engaged in humanitarian interventions for the primary intention of ending human
rights abuses and saving civilian lives, then the question arises in the case of Yemen: with
citizens trapped in the middle of a dangerous conflict with nowhere to go and lacking the proper
medical resources and food to survive, why is the United States, who’s politicians and journalists
are normally very loud about its humanitarian and democratic principles, standing idly by? The
answer to this is that the U.S. is involved, though not with respect to upholding the
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Responsibility to Protect. Instead, America is involved through its support for Saudi Arabia’s
coalition to fight al-Qaeda in the area. It openly sells weapons to Saudi Arabia to help its fight
against al-Qaeda in Yemen. However, it has become increasingly clear that the Saudi-led
coalition has only contributed to the destruction in Yemen and has not been effective in defeating
al-Qaeda. American leaders have been so vocal and quick to use just war language to support
intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, yet the same can hardly be said in the case of
Yemen.
Few American politicians are pushing for U.S. action in Yemen to end civilian suffering.
Senator Chris Murphy and Senator Rand Paul have been vocal about their opposition to the
United States’ role in Yemen. In September 2017, Senator Rand Paul took the Senate floor to
argue that U.S. participation in the war is a violation of the country’s Constitution because it was
never authorized by Congress. The Senator also compares the events to Libya and Syria, arguing
that the fight against the Houthis could lead to the possibility of al-Qaeda filling the vacuum. 75 In
this way, American involvement by aiding Saudi Arabia, or by a direct American intervention,
will not end or even relieve the suffering of the Yemeni people because of the likelihood of alQaeda’s influence afterward.
While activists laud these senators for their actions, this is only the beginning of
diplomatic criticism as an approach to this issue. Saudi Arabia and its allies, including the United
States, must be “named and blamed”, in the words of Pattison; they must become aware of their
actions and held accountable for their consequences. The more its allies and other leaders

75

Robert Naiman, “Rand Paul: Unconstitutional Saudi War in Yemen Is Not in Our Interest,”
Huffington Post. 18 Sept. 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/rand-paulunconstitutional-saudi-war-in-yemen-is-not_us_59c037f8e4b0f96732cbc872.

37
criticize its actions, the more damage its legitimacy and reputation will face. This will hopefully
push the country to alter its behavior.
Lack of media coverage and overall discussion on the humanitarian crises in Yemen
relative to Afghanistan and Syria reveal the actual motive behind what influences U.S. action in
the Middle East. In Afghanistan and Syria, the regime in power was not favorable to American
interests, so the policy to follow was regime change under the guise of humanitarian action.
American leaders cannot argue that it stands for humanitarian rights of the people in the Middle
East when many of them ignore the immense suffering of Yemeni civilians.
Conclusion
If appropriately implemented and followed, just war theory allows leaders to limit the
destructiveness of war. However, as this paper has shown, the improper use of this theory has led
to America’s involvement in complex wars, some of which it cannot find its way out of, and all
of which greatly exacerbate humanitarian issues in the Middle East.
While the theory’s practicality makes it preferable to other moral theories about war like
pacifism and realism, it is not flawless and so it is important to remain critical of the ways in
which leaders use the theory to justify their actions abroad. Specifically, Michael Walzer’s
definition of the supreme emergency case is highlighted as just war theory’s greatest flaw and
drawback. In recent years, the focus on just war theory’s utilitarianism is evident in Obama’s
escalation of counterterrorism policies. Specifically, his creation of a “kill list” allowed him to
authorize the killing of American-Yemeni minor Abdulrahman al-Awlaki without trial. This
portion to the moral theory is extremely flawed as it accomplishes the opposite of what just war
theory is intended to: it removes the limits of war and allows a leader like the American
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president to make executive decisions, like attacking enemy civilians, if it means protecting his
own.
A focus on diplomatic criticism, outlined by James Pattison, should be made instead.
Diplomatic criticism uses the last resort principle of just war theory to argue that we must spend
more time in criticizing the unlawful actions of states before intervening. This retrains the
potential for states to hastily enter wars unjustly, as was the case with the American intervention
in Afghanistan in 2011.
In the case of Afghanistan, America began a war with what looked like the right
intention—to protect its citizens from another terrorist attack. However, the Bush
administration’s method of invading the country with haste led to strategic failures and
disorganization, resulting in an unstable new government and the Taliban regaining control of
land, demonstrating their disregard for other important just war principles. The exploitation of
just war language allowed the Bush administration to convince the public that the threat of the
terrorists was immediate and urgent. However, it was clear the U.S. failed in checking off other
criteria of the just war doctrine.
In Syria, Obama appeared to have considered the last resort principle. While he seemed
hesitant in involving U.S. troops directly with the Syrian civil war in 2014, the former president
had inserted himself in Syria’s affairs by covertly arming and training rebel groups in Syria since
2013. This strategy was unsuccessful as many rebels held ties with terrorist organizations that
deliberately attacked civilian areas.
While Walzer’s description of humanitarian action states that humanitarian action comes
first and regime change follows, Yemen’s case demonstrates that this is not entirely accurate.
The case in Yemen serves as a counterpoint to the argument that the United States is committing
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to upholding the Responsibility to Protect and that it only engages in humanitarian interventions
for the sole purpose of saving civilian lives, rather than to fulfill its own political or military
aims.
Just war theory is the most relevant and practical theory we have in thinking about the
morality of war, but American leaders must do better in portraying the information and evidence
available to the public and must be careful in immediately framing situations into just war
language. More attention must be given to James Pattison’s diplomatic criticism as an approach
to dealing with states, as its focus on the Last Resort further limits instances of war. It is
important to name and blame the states responsible for the suffering that their cause before their
actions lead to long-term consequences, like unstable governments and a larger al-Qaeda
influence, for these regions and for the rest of the world. Grave humanitarian crises must be
addressed, but there are other ways in accomplishing this than through the firing of more bullets,
drones, and missiles into the Middle East.
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